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"Found my way upstairs and had a smoke
Somebody spoke and I went into a dream...
I'd love to turn you on."
A Day In The Life,
The Beatles.
"But something is happening
And you don't know what it is,
Do you, Mr. Jones?
Ballad of a Thin Man,
Bob Dylan.
Mr. Jones is still probably asking why. He is part of a society that is
increasingly turning on. A recent Administrative Task Force conservatively
estimated that at least 5,000,000 Americans have used marihuana at least
once.'
Dr. Stanley Yolles, director of the National Institute of Mental Health,
puts the total far higher: at least 12 million and perhaps even 20 million.2
Marihuana is mostly used by the young, although Mr. Jones is also
experimenting with it. TIME estimates that between 25% to 40% of all
American students have tried it at least once. Canadian studies show an
average of 15% to 20% of Canadian college students have had at least one
experience with marihuana.3
In 1964, 93 persons were arrested in Metro Toronto on charges involving
marihuana and the related drug hashish. By contrast, R.C.M.P. figures in
October show 832 arrests on such charges in Metro so far this year.4
But Mr. Jones is still asking why.
Some attribute it to an alienated youth lost and frustrated in a complex
and alien society. Others say it is only a resulting manifestation of young
*Paul J. Cavalluzzo, LL.B. is a member of the graduating class of 1970 of Osgoode
Hall Law School. This paper was awarded The Thomas Cowper Robinette Memorial
Prize. Substantial segments of this paper were written under the guidance of Prof.
P. C. Weiler.
1 Time, September 26, 1969.
2 Ibid p. 63.
3 McGill News, 3 March, 1969; Loyola Conference on Student Use and Abuse of
Drugs, November, 1968.
4 Toronto Daily Star, November 6, 1969, p. 6.
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people raised in a society that is so dependent on drugs. Young people say
it is an indication of an emerging way of life. The marihuana laws symbolize
society's unwillingness to recognize the individual's right to enjoy himself in
this world. Whatever it is, Mr. Jones will have to look elsewhere to solve
his 'problem'. This note will not attempt to do so.
This paper will attempt to do three things. First, it will review what
evidence we have on marihuana. What is it? What are its effects? What does
it lead to? It is important to remember that this paper is concerned with
marihuana alone. Secondly, this paper will consider whether the criminal
law is the proper societal tool to control the use of marihuana. Finally, this
paper will review the treatment of marihuana offenders in our courts. What
kinds of sentences are they imposing? What are the courts trying to do?
Have the courts rationally approached this problem? At the end, some
conclusions will be made about judicial action in this area.
II. MARIHUANA
A. Physical and Psychological Effects
It would be foolish to attempt to describe a 'high'. Marihuana has
unique effects on its users. However, there are a few general statements which
can be made. The Medical Society of the County of New York has classified
marihuana as a mild hallucinogen. It can impair judgment and memory; it
can cause psychotic episodes in predisposed people.5 Most important, it
usually makes the user feel good. It may relax him. It may enhance his
sensory perceptions. It may induce uncontrollable laughter. Generally, the
experience under the influence of marihuana is a pleasing one. This euphoric
experience usually lasts about three or four hours. Fortunately there are no
'hangover' effects from marihuana.
I would now like to discuss whether the use of the drug is physically
harmful. For many years it was believed that marihuana was addictive, that
is, that it induced physical dependence. By this I mean a state that manifests
itself by intense physical disturbances when the administration of the drug is
suspended. This theory was attacked by the famous La Guardia Report in
1944.6 The report stated that the use of marihuana did not lead to physical
degeneration and that permanent deleterious effects were not observable.
However, this report did not go unchallenged. In an editorial in the Journal
of the American Medical Association7 it was advised that "public officials will
do well to disregard this unscientific, uncritical study and to regard marihuana
as a menace wherever it is purveyed." But the A.M.A. did relent, although
5 See Task Force Report: Narcotics and Drug Abuse-The President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, p. 13.
6 Mayor's Commission on Marihuana, The Marihuana Problem in the City of
New York (1944).
7April 28, 1945.
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twenty years later, when in 1967 it said that no physical dependence on mari-
huana has yet been demonstrated and that it has not been shown that mari-
huana causes addiction or leads to any lasting mental or physical changes.
Margaret Mead, the noted anthropologist, recently told a Congressional
committee that marihuana is less harmful than cigarettes and alcohol.8 A
similar conclusion was reached by the well-respected British Advisory Com-
mittee on Drug Dependence. 9 Evaluating the possibility of long term harm,
the Committee concluded that "having regard to all the material available to
us we find ourselves in agreement.., that the long term consumption of
cannabis in moderate doses has no harmful effects" and "that in terms of
physical harmfulness, cannabis is very much less dangerous than the opiates,
amphetamines and barbiturates and also less dangerous than alcohol."
The President's Commission concluded that marihuana does not induce
physical dependence. 10 So it can be said that the authorities generally agree
that marihuana is not physically addictive and that it is not likely to cause
physically harmful effects.
Whether marihuana induces psychological dependence is another ques-
tion. The President's Commission concluded that it does.' Most writers
would agree with this. However, alcohol or chocolate ice cream may induce
psychological dependence. So this is not reason enough to ban the drug.
We must then ask whether it causes any mental ill effects. As is so often the
case in this area experts give conflicting evidence on this question. Schwartz
wrote that ". . . depending on the complex interaction of a number of variables
of which the drug is only one, hashish and, to a lesser extent, marihuana can
be associated with personality deterioration...-12 Eddy et al, however, said
that, for cannabis, there is 'no unequivocal evidence.., that lasting mental
changes are produced.' 3 Kalant concluded that "it would appear that no
valid conclusion to the effect that the chronic use of cannabis is harmful or
that it is not harmful can be drawn at present.' 4
This is the approach that was recently taken by the Canadian Medical
Association in its brief to the federal commission on non-medical drug use:
"In our opinion the effects of long-term use of cannabis (marihuana) are
unknown. We are singularly unimpressed with the inadequate scientific evidence
used to substantiate the extreme range of opinions-from marihuana is totally
harmless at one end, to the use of marihuana leads to the use of hard drugs and
the resulting effects at the other... The catastrophic results of allowing the use
of substances without full knowledge of the results, such as tobacco and thalido-
mide must be avoided." (15)
8 Newsweek, November 19, 1969.
9 Home Office: Cannabis report, H.M.S.O., London, 1968.
lo Supra, n.5, at p. 13.
1 Ibid. at pp. 13 and 122.
12 Paper presented at Western Regional Meeting of Canadian Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, Vancouver, January, 1969.
13 Drug Dependence: its significance and characteristics, Bull., W.H.O. 32:721, 1965.
14An Interim Guide to Cannabis Literature. Addiction Research Foundation,
Toronto, 1968.
15 November 6, 1969.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
This does not mean that the C.M.A. was happy with the present legal
situation. It recommended a re-thinking of our drug laws. This has also been
recommended by Family Court Judge William Little and Ontario Supervising
Coroner Dr. H. B. Cotnam to the extent of legalizing marihuana. The
reasons for these positions will be thoroughly discussed in the following
sections.
In closing I would like to present the most recent statement (at the time
of writing this paper) on this particular problem. It is a draft of a preliminary
brief to the Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs.16
The report was written by Dr. Kenneth Keith Yonge, President of the
Canadian Psychiatric Association.
The conclusion drawn is that marihuana is harmful to health:
"All the psychotrophic drugs at present being used non-medically on a wide scale
in Canada, particularly by youth, are definitely harmful - marihuana certainly
included. They are all detrimental to health (health as defined by the World Health
Organization as a "state of complete physical, mental and social well-being").
On this we can be firm and definite in the face of opinions of others to the
contrary who argue that there is no reliable evidence that these drugs cause
damage to the brain structure."
More specifically "the use of these drugs does indeed induce lasting changes
in personality functioning, changes which are pathological in so much as they
impair the mental and social well being".
Furthermore, "the argument that marihuana is no more harmful than
alcohol is specious". The primary action of alcohol, he writes, is that of a
relaxant with mental impairment occurring only when intoxicating quantities
are consumed. Marihuana, on the other hand, acts solely as an intoxicant,
its effect being primarily the distortion of perception and reasoning.
As to whether marihuana is addictive, Dr. Yonge said the user becomes
psychologically dependent. "There is ample evidence that people who use
the psychotropic drugs, including marihuana, tend to do so habitually".
Finally, he writes of a regression:
"the trend toward instant self-gratification and artificial self-exploration (by the
use of psychotropic drugs) is distinctly regressive--a reversion to the immature,
the primitive".
He concludes that the laws prohibiting the supply and use of psychotropic
drugs (including marihuana) should not be made any more permissive.
However, the penalties under the law should be drastically changed to render
them more appropriate and remedial.
It would be remiss of me if I did not point out that this paper touched off
a row in Canadian psychiatric circles. Dr. Aldwyn Stokes, President-elect of
the C.P.A., said that this paper only represented the personal views of Dr.
Yonge and not the views of the Association. 7 He referred to the paper as "a
paper that comes down on the side of discipline". He said that since Dr.
Yonge's paper was distributed, the Association has set up a formal committee
to formulate a consensus within the profession that will lead to the presenta-
tion of a brief to the Le Dain Commission.
16 The Globe and Mail, November 21, 1969 p. 7.
17 The Globe and Mail, November 21, 1969, p. 4.
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B. A Prelude to Harder Drugs
One of the main contentions of those who oppose liberalizing the mari-
huana laws is that marihuana inevitably leads to heroin or other more
dangerous drugs. This conclusion has been drawn because most heroin users
at one time or another used marihuana. However, this stepping-stone theory
of addiction is based on illogical reasoning. Judge Charles Wyzanski aptly
described that reasoning in the following terms:
It is, of course, absurd to argue that because most users of heroin first used
marihuana, marihuana is proved to be a preliminary step to heroin addiction.
One might as well say that because most users of heroin once imbibed milk, milk
leads to heroin addiction."' 8
The President's Commission came to a similar conclusion because
"(T)here are too many marihuana users who do not graduate to heroin, and
too many heroin addicts with no prior marihuana use, to support such a
theory. Moreover, there is no scientific basis for such a theory."'19
Whether one progresses to harder drugs likely depends on his environ-
ment. Howard S. Becker has stated that the use of marihuana depends upon
the availability of the drug.20 This would also seem to be true of the harder
drugs. So if a marihuana user lives in the suburbs he is not likely to graduate
to the harder drugs because he will not come into contact with them. This
seems to be borne out by the findings of The President's Commission:
"The evidence from our college students and utopiate and news articles is clear
that many persons not in heroin-risk neighbourhoods who experiment with
marihuana do not progress to hard drugs."21
Margaret Mead has suggested a counter theory to this. She reasoned
that youngsters progress from marihuana to the so-called hard drugs, because
possession of either, being a felonious offence, they may as well be hanged
for sheep as for lambs.22 However, this is unlikely to be the case because most
young people stay with marihuana because they believe it is not harmful to
them. Criminality or the amount of punishment is unlikely to be a considera-
tion in their choice of drugs. My reasons for this proposition will be discussed
in a later section.
The only evidence which I could find that substantiated the theory was
that of the now defunct American Bureau of Narcotics. In one of their
pamphlets, "Living Death", 1965, it warned that "it cannot be too strongly
emphasized that the smoking of the marihuana cigarette is a dangerous first
step on the road which usually leads to enslavement by heroin". In a well
thought article, "Marihuana and Legal Controls", D. E. Miller, former Chief
Counsel of the Bureau, stated that marihuana leads to the stronger addictive
opiates. 23 However, it is likely that this is just an instance of a bureaucratic
organization protecting the status quo in order to preserve one of its
Is A. Geller and M. Boas, The Drug Beat, N.Y. 1969 Cowles Book Co. Inc.
19 Supra, n.5 at p. 14.20 Marihuana Use and the Social Context, in E. Goode, Marihuana N.Y., 1969.
21 Supra, n. 5 at p. 24 .
22 Newsveek, November 10, 1969, p. 45.
23 In E. Goode, Supra n. 20 at p. 167.
19701 219
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
functions.24 The last Commissioner of the Bureau, H. I. Giordano, in discus-
sing the legalization of marihuana, stated:
"I am afraid this is just another effort to break down our whole American
system." 26
The empirical relationship between marihuana and the harder drugs has
not been adequately tested. However, there is no possible scientific basis for
using the theory presented in this section as a reason for not liberalizing the
marihuana laws.
C. A Prelude to Crime and Violence
Another contention of the opponents to the relaxation of the marihuana
laws is that the drug leads to crime and violence. If this is true, then this
contention is the most persuasive in criminalizing marihuana use because now
the user is affecting the interests of other people and not merely his own.
Probably the first study which substantiated this theory was a report by
the district attorney of New Orleans submitted to the Hearings on Taxation
of Marihuana Before the House Ways and Means Committee, 1937. It
found that 125 of 450 convicted of major crimes in 1930 were regular
marihuana users. Approximately one-half the murderers and a fifth of those
tried for larcency, robbery and assault were regular users. However, the
efficacy of these results has been questioned.26 Perhaps we should be wary of
reports from district attorneys from New Orleans because of the recent
experience we have had with the present one.
Similarly the Narcotic Addiction Foundation of British Columbia, in a
recent policy statement outlining "what we know about the drug", found
"indisputable evidence that the stronger forms of the drug . . . are directly
connected with crimes of violence and anti-social behavior".27
Finally, as was expected, the Chief Counsel of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, D. E. Miller, agrees with this position. He states
"In the final analysis it is clear that marihuana may be causally associated with
the commission of crimes in a number of ways, depending upon the variability of
the strength of the dose and the underlying personality of the user."28
But surely Mr. Miller could just as easily have been discussing alcohol.29
The authorities holding the opposite position are just as formidable, if
not more so. The Medical Society of the County of New York has stated
flatly that there is no evidence that marihuana use is associated with crimes
of violence.8 0 The 1962 report of the President's Ad Hoc Panel on Drug
24 See J. H. Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, 41, S.C.L.
Rev. 588, pp. 597-601.
25 E. Goode, supra n. 20 at p. 154.
20 See President's Commision, supra, n. 5, p. 13.
27 Comment, Marihuana, Canadian Mental Health, 16:28, September-October 1968.
28 E. Goode, Supra n. 20 at p. 166.
29 Of course the fact that marihuana is less harmful than alcohol or tobacco does
not alone justify its legalization. There must be other justifying reasons which will be
developed later in this article.
30 Medicine, May 5, 1966, p. 3.
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Abuse found the evidence inadequate to substantiate the reputation of mari-
huana for inciting people to anti-social acts.31 The famous La Guardia Report
(supra) did not observe any aggression in subjects to whom marihuana was
given. In "The Cannabis Habit: A Review of Recent Psychiatric Literature",
Professor H. B. Murphy of McGill University states that although aggressive
or antisocial behaviour can occur, it "is agreed to be less common with
cannabis than with alcohol" and that "most serious observers agree that
cannabis does not per se induce aggressive or criminal activities, and that the
reduction of work-drive leads to a negative correlation with criminality rather
than a positive one".3
2
Finally, Kalant, in one of the most recent critical reviews available,
concludes that "there appears to be no evidence that the use of the drug in
itself causes crimes of violence, sexual arousal or anti-social behaviour." 33
Where does all this conflicting scientific evidence leave the legislator?
He is the one who must make the decision. I think he can safely assume
that the effects of marihuana depend more on the individual than on the
drug itself. But is this reason enough to relax the marihuana laws? It clearly
is not. He now requires direction in other areas. Therefore we must give the
legislator guidance in our own area of competence. Hence, with this
scientific evidence in mind we must now question whether the criminal law
is the proper tool to control the use of marihuana.
Im. LEGISLATIVE POLICY OF MARIHUANA LAWS
In this section I will attempt to describe legislative policy on marihuana.
In essence, it will be a brief discussion of present narcotic legislation. This
is because marihuana and other narcotic drugs have been inextricably bound
together by Parliament. There has been no distinction at all between mari-
huana and other drugs although one is clearly called for. The question that
has been asked throughout this section is:
"What is Parliament trying to do?"
The first piece of legislation regulating the use of narcotic drugs in
Canada was enacted in 1908. The only prescribed narcotic drug was opium.
Cannabis (marihuana) was not added to the schedule of forbidden narcotic
drugs until 1923. At this time there was no legislative discussion as to its
inclusion. However in reading the Debates one can observe three factors
which appear to underlie the policy of narcotic legislation in the earlier
periods.
Initially Parliament looked upon the problem of narcotics as an
Oriental one.34 Secondly, in implementing this legislation Canada was ful-
31 Proceedings 286: Report of Ad Hoe Panel on Drug Abuse.
32 Bull., Narcotics, 15:15 January-March, 1963.
33 Kalant, Supra n. 14.
34 See Debates, Sess. 1910-11, Vol I, p. 468.
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filling one of her international obligations.35 Thirdly, the protection of the
young was a major interest considered in the enactment of their legislation. 36
Between 1908 and 1961 there were piecemeal amendments in narcotic
legislation. However, in 1954 there was a major overhaul of the legislation.
In this year there was an important change in the legislative framework. But
for our purposes it is sufficient to say that there was no real change in policy
although the protection of the young became less important as an interest
in the legislation.37
In 1961, the Narcotic Control Act completely revamped the law and
policy in this area. It eliminated many of the old offences like possession
of an opium pipe. Also it more systematically laid out the offences with which
the Parliament was concerned.
In Part I of the Act Parliament has set out four offences. Section 3
prohibits the possession (as defined in the Code) of a narcotic (a substance
listed in the schedule). The offender is guilty of an indictable offence and is
liable to imprisonment for 7 years. Notice that Parliament has removed
the required minimum for this offence.
Section 4 prohibits the trafficking of a narcotic or the possession of any
narcotic for the purpose of trafficking. The offender is guilty of an indictable
offence and is liable to imprisonment for life. This is a significant increase in
the severity of the sentence, especially for the first offender. The purpose of
this legislative provision is obvious.
Mr. W. Monteith, the then Minister of National Health and Welfare,
described it in the following words:
"In this way Parliament will have indicated clearly the seriousness with which it
regards trafficking offences and the courts can, therefore, take cognizance of this
in fixing appropriate penalties."38
Later in the debates, 39 Mr. Fulton more specifically described the
purposes of the trafficking provision:
"It would seem that appropriate federal legislation against illegal drug trafficking
should be designed:
(a) to deter the would-be trafficker;
(b) to teach a salutary lesson to the peddlar who may deal in small transactions
and also to the major distributor who may deal in only a few large ones;
(c) to attempt to assist the convicted trafficker to live in society upon his release
without engaging in this form of activity;
(d) to remove from society for substantial periods, those persons who have demon-
strated by their previous conduct that they are not likely to refrain from this
type of conduct in the future."
Thus Mr. Fulton has described general deterrence, rehabilitation and
incapacitation as the justifications for the punishment of traffickers.
Section 5 prohibits the import into Canada or export from Canada of
any narcotic. The offender is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to
35 Ibid., at 2521.
30 See Debates, 1921, Vol. Hr, p. 2901.
37 See Debates, 1953-54, Vol. V, p. 5319.
38 Debates, 1960-61, Vol. VI, 5980.
39 Ibid., 5987.
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imprisonment for life but not less than seven years. The purpose of this
provision was simply described by Mr. Monteith:
40
"If it were not for the illicit importation of narcotics, there would be no
trafficking problem and, correspondingly, no problem of narcotic addiction."
Of course, exporting is prohibited so that Canada could fulfil her international
obligations.
Section 6 prohibits the cultivation of opium or marihuana except under
federal authority. The violator is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable
to imprisonment for seven years. When discussing this provision Mr. Mon-
teith defended the prohibition of marihuana growing but he also under-
estimated its use in Canada at the time:
"The use of marihuana as a drug of addiction in Canada is fortunately not wide-
spread. It, however, may well provide a stepping stone to addiction to heroin and
here again marihuana is prohibited except under licence." 41
Part 11 of the Act is where Parliament clearly shows a departure from
its former approach to the drug problem. The reason for this was the failure
of the former approach:
" . .. the programme embraced in that legislation (i.e., past), had not been
effective to solve the problems of narcotic addiction and narcotic trafficking. A
new approach is therefore necessary." 42
Mr. Fulton generally described the purposes of the new approach as follows:
"First, to reduce so far as possible the supply of drugs brought in and distributed
for illegal purposes; second, but simultaneously, to reduce the demand for illegal
drugs by providing effective treatment for existing addicts, and third, to prevent
the creation of additional demand by preventing, so far as possible, the creation of
new addicts."43
Section 15 of Part H calls for the preventive detention for an indeter-
minate period of a person convicted of an offence under section 4 or 5
(trafficking and import or export) if that person
(a) has been previously convicted under these sections on a separate
occasion, or
(b) has been previously sentenced to preventive detention under this
section.
Section 16 permits the court to remand a person charged under 3, 4 or 5,
for observation and examination for a period not exceeding 7 days. Section
17 provides that where a person who has been remanded under s. 16 is
convicted, then the court, in sentencing, must consider the evidence of the
examination. Where the court is satisfied that the person is a narcotic addict,
then it shall, notwithstanding anything in section 15, sentence him to
custody for treatment for an indeterminate period.
Effective treatment was called for, Mr. Fulton suggested because of:
"the heartbreaking fact that under the present system the criminal addict is going
through our penal institutions in a never ending cycle; crime, arrest, conviction,
40 Ibid., 5981.
41 Ibid., p. 5981.
42 Ibid., Fulton, p. 5982.
43 Ibid., 5982.
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incarceration for a stated term, release, return to evil haunts and associations and
again into the cycle of crime, arrest and conviction." 44
He then proceeded to describe the expanded purposes of criminal punishment
in this area:
The consideration of this situation has led to the conclusion that what is needed
is a concentrated effort to reform and rehabilitate rather than simply to in-
carcerate. 45
Mr. Fulton then went on to describe the purpose and hopeful effect of the
proposed treatment:
"(The Act) ... is to provide the appropriate institutional treatment to remedy
the fundamental delinquency of the addict to abstain from using drugs during
substantial periods of his life in the community." 46
Part II of the Act was never in effect as it did not receive Royal proclamation.
It seems that Parliament recognized the weakness of this approach and hence
it was never put in use.
Finally Mr. Fulton commented on the fact that the sentence for traffick-
ing did not require a minimum. He stated that:
"the provisions of this bill will give almost complete discretion to the courts to
adopt the course that is indicated as most appropriate in the individual cases,
•.."47
Hence, first offenders could be treated more leniently.
In the last few months the legislature has amended the "possession"
section. This amendment is found in section 12 of An Act to Amend the
Food and Drug Act and The Narcotic Control Act and to make consequential
amendments to the Criminal Code.48 The important difference is that there
is an option now. Anyone convicted of possession of marihuana on summary
conviction is liable to a fine of $1000 and/or imprisonment for six months for
the first offence. For each subsequent offence he is liable to a fine of $2000
and/or imprisonment for one year. If the offender is convicted on indictment,
he is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.
This is the present status of marihuana legislation in Canada. Is the
policy of this legislation realistic? Are its purposes being effected? Are there
alternatives to the present approach to the problem of drugs? These are some
of the questions to which we will now turn in the next section.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS IN USING THE CRIMINAL LAW AS AN
INSTRUMENT CONTROLLING IMMORAL BEHAVIOUR
A. Law and Morals
This section is intended to present the different contemporary positions





48 Assented to June 27, 1969.
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questions here. First, should the State use its power to legislate morals?
Secondly, if this is a legitimate use of power, then in what circumstances
should it criminally prohibit the conduct believed to be immoral?
The first position that I will present is that of Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen 49 which has recently been reiterated by Lord Devlin 0 . They believe
that it is the true province of the criminal law to restrict or prohibit immoral
conduct. Historically the criminal law of England has concerned itself with
moral principles. The common law is steeped in the Christian tradition so
that it is foolish to deny entry of the criminal law into the area of morality.
Crime and sin are inextricably bound and a denial of this proposition would
be disastrous to the crminal law or morality.
Lord Devlin believes that a common morality pervades our society.
'There are certain standards of behaviour or moral principles which society
requires to be observed; and the breach of them is an offence not merely against
the person who is injured but against society as a whole." 51
It is this danger to society which is the chief concern of Lord Devlin.
His theory has been called the "disintegration thesis". Society is bound
together by invisible bonds of common thought (be they social, economic,
political or moral). The members of society would drift apart if these bonds
were relaxed. A common morality is part of their bondage as is a common
political philosophy. Any conduct which threatens any of these bonds must
be prohibited. Hence, we have made an act of treason punishable by the
criminal law because it endangers our political way of life. Likewise we should
prohibit any conduct which breaches the common morality because that, too,
is a danger to our social existence.
This position has also been accepted by the sociologist Durkheim.52
However, Durkheim sees another purpose of the law in regulating immoral
behaviour. He agrees that it protects the common morality. But he also sees
the law as "giving satisfactory vent to a sense of outrage because if the vent
is closed the common conscience would lose its energy and the cohesive
morality would weaken." 58 So the criminal trial then becomes a symbolic
reinforcement of what people believe to be morally bad.
This clearly answers the first question presented at the outset. However,
now we must decide when we will implement the criminal law in regulating
such behaviour. Of course, the problem now becomes one of checking the
legitimate use of power. Lord Devlin recognized this as he realized the
dangers of a paternalistic society. He knew that the law should also be
concerned with the rights of the individual. He believes in the liberal principle
of tolerance. However, society cannot withstand unlimited tolerance. "There
must be toleration of the maximum individual freedom that is consistent with
the integrity of society." 54 Therefore the use of the law in this area is
49 Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.
50 The Enforcement of Morals.
51 Ibid.52 Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, 1958.
55Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, (1967), 35 U. of
Chicago, L. Rev. 1, at p. 8.
54 Devlin, op. cit. 16.
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dependent on a balancing process analogous to the approach used by Justice
Frankfurter in the United States Supreme Court. This necessarily entails a
deliberate judgment by the power structure as to when certain conduct is
injurious to society and the individual. But what are the standards of
decision-making?
Lord Devlin supplies a simple answer. The moral judgment of society
is to be determined by the ubiquitous reasonable man. Immorality then
becomes what the right minded person believes to be such. The problems with
this are innumerable. Who is the right minded person? Surely the beliefs of a
right minded person differ between Toronto and Barrie, or even between
Yorkville and East York. Immorality, then, becomes a function of geographi-
cal location. Furthermore, there are times when it is unwise to push democratic
principles too far. Sometimes the right minded person is 'wrong'. It is then
the responsibility of the power structure to lead public opinion rather than
follow it. This is particularly true in such nebulous areas as morality or
such complex matters as the relationship between the law and morality.
I hope that I have objectively presented the case of Lord Devlin. This
is not the place to affirm or reject his approach. However, I would suggest
that this position has been accepted by the judiciary as is demonstrated by
the following statements of Viscount Simonds, in Shaw v. D.P.P.:55
"There remains in the courts of law a residual power to enforce the supreme
and fundamental purpose of the law, to conserve not only the safety and order
but also the moral welfare of the State."
The other side of the argument was presented by John Stuart Mill in his
great essay On Liberty. Mill believed that "the only purpose for which power
can be rightly exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others." This position has been recently
rearticulated by H. L. A. Hart in Law, Liberty and Morality (1963). The
new Utilitarians realize the inadequacies of Mill's simple formula but they also
see it as a basis of a new approach which takes into account relevant
considerations which have been disregarded by the legal moralists.
Immorality should not be viewed as the principal or sufficient reason for
calling conduct criminal. This is so, for the following reasons. First, the
new Utilitarians deny the existence of a common morality or a bondage of
common thought. This is especially true in a pluralistic society like Canada
where the diverse backgrounds of its citizens provide a very heterogenous
society. Lord Devlin's approach may have relevance to a homogeneous
society such as England but its application to North America must be seriously
questioned. Canada is a 'mosaic' or 'melting pot' of different philosophies. Its
moral norms are diverse as are its social, economic or political norms. "In a
society that neither has nor wants a unitary set of moral norms, the enforce-
ment of morals carries a heavy cost in repression."6 6 Therefore the criminal
sanction should only be used in this area where there is a social consensus
as to the immorality of the conduct. But does this not suggest that there is a
common morality?
G5 (1962) A.C. 220 at 267.50Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, p. 265.
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Most Canadians feel that murder, rape, or robbery are immoral. No
one would argue that these immoral acts should not be criminally proscribed.
Does this lead one to the conclusion that crime and sin are inextricably
bound? The contemporary Utilitarians would suggest not. H. L. A. Hart
calls this the 'interaction of crime and sin'. A. W. Mewett calls this connection
entirely fortuitous. "If the moral law and the criminal law coincide, it is not
purely because the immoral act has a criminal sanction attached but because
some other element is present which renders that act a fit subject for the
criminal law."57 This leads us to our next consideration.
Contemporary Utilitarians generally agree that before conduct is crimin-
ally proscribed, it must cause physical harm to the person or property of
someone. This standard of proscription provides us with a concrete rule that
is not dependent on nebulous concepts such as immorality. It also gives us a
definite purpose so that in proscribing conduct we should be aware of what
we are attempting to do. Unfortunately in legislating morals we lose sight of
what we are trying to do with the criminal law. But is this Utilitarian approach
adequate? I would suggest not. The problem at hand requires a more
sophisticated approach than is provided by the 'physical harm' test. Today
there are many criminal laws proscribing conduct which does not cause
physical harm. In such cases the state is legitimately using its power to
enforce a positive morality in order to protect its citizens.
I would suggest that the legitimacy of state action should not be
dependent upon an either-or approach as is provided for by the physical
harm test but by a workable balancing process to be developed in the next
few sections.
B. The Suggested Approach
(a) Priorities of State Intervention 58
The overriding issue is the legitimate extent of state intervention with
individual liberty through the criminal law. Stated another way: What
activity should the criminal law proscribe or alternatively what conduct
should it prescribe?
For clarity's sake, this issue must be examined from four levels of
priority abstractions vis-a-vis state intervention. These levels are:
1. conduct which causes actual harm to other people (society),
2. conduct which causes actual harm to the individual,
3. conduct involving risk of harm to other people (society) and
4. conduct involving risk of harm to the individual.
At each level the activity should be viewed in relation to the character of the
harm it causes or may cause balanced against the right of the individual to
remain unimpeded by the state (freedom of the individual, freedom of choice,
57 Morals and the Criminal Law (1962) 14 U.T.L.J. 213 at 223.
58 This model was developed by G. Adams, B.A., LL.B., in an unpublished paper
presented to Prof. P. C. Weiler in a research seminar.
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sanctity of the individual). It is suggested that the levels ascend in order of
their diminishing priority vis-a-vis legitimate state concern.
The first level of abstraction, actual harm to others, is patently the most
compelling in terms of legitimate state intervention. The community we live
in, by virtue of its name, demands physical and proprietary security. Just as
it establishes rules and regulations for its administration called government, so
too, standards of required conduct are legislatively enacted and enforced. It is
totally unacceptable that individuals may resort to physical abuse, whatever
the cause, or that they take what "rightfully" belongs to another. All disputes
are to be settled through legitimized channels of appeal and discourse, leading
to peaceful and binding solution. Society in turn is benefitted by the continuity
of peaceful co-existence and orderly exchange of ideas, articles of trade and
social interaction. So too, the individual benefits, allowing him to maximize
his own potential without fear of an attack by a fellow denizen. By sacrificing
some individual liberty, the individual is allowed to maximize the residual
(which is considerable). J. S. Mill has suggested that this is the only
legitimate form of state intervention - the proscription of conduct which
causes actual harm to others.59
The second level of conduct, that which causes actual harm to the
individual, does not possess the same compelling characteristics in favour of
state concern. Witness John Stewart Mill. This is one of the levels at which
the volatile debate involving law and morals rages. I might add that many
philosopher-participants try to finesse this level by resorting to justification
at some level distinct from this one, thereby evading any discussion of
paternalism. This ploy clouds the "true" issue and is unacceptable. The query
at bar, is not to have regard to any concommitant benefit or harm, actual or
possible, that may accrue to society through the proscription or neglect of
the specific conduct by the criminal law. The fact that an individual by harm-
ing himself so, too, indirectly harms society by his lack of productivity,
ambition or even existence, causing a possible threat to the very existence
of society as we know it, must be dealt with at another level, (which has even
less priority as we are then examining risk of harm and not actual harm).
In this second instance then, we are discussing the merits of a form of
state paternalism. But because actual harm to the individual is at stake,
it is a form most easily recognized as legitimate. The justification appears to
be two-fold. First, society feels the individual will be happier and better off
if he refrains from pursuing this specific course of action. The collective
"we" has looked "rationally" at different forms of behaviour, deciding which
form is best or inversely, what the individual should not do. Conduct which is
individually harmful prevents a member of society from maximizing his
happiness. This line of reasoning leads imperceptively into the second
justification which depends on individual freedom as a comer-stone. If
the individual follows this particular course of action he will lose all
freedom he now possesses. The drug user, if allowed to purchase drugs
5 9John S. Mill, On Liberty (1859); See also H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty and
Morality (1963); Glanville Williams, Authoritarian Morals and the Criminal Law,
1966 Crim. L. R. 132.
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freely, will become so dependent upon them, that any freedom heretofore
possessed will vanish. Similarly, the potential suicide, if allowed to act
freely in his depressed state, so extinguishes irrevocably the entity that once
had freedom of choice (obvious problem here in terms of effectiveness, and a
reliance on the notion of lack of capacity). Such activities that are harmful
to the individual can, therefore, take away the very freedom that the actor
suggests the state is impinging upon, This impingement then preserves all the
other areas of liberty where individual rights can be exercised. Are not such
laws quite consistent with individual liberty?
A derivative observation, which will hold throughout the discussion is the
fact that individual freedom is not an absolute value. Accommodation and
compromise with other values and objectives runs throughout the area of
legislative enactment.
The third level of analysis, conduct involving risk of harm to society,
is the level at which Lord Devlin fences. Obviously he never answers Mill in
terms of a justification at the second level of legitimate state intervention and
this is why I said that some participants tended to finesse the true issues.
Justification at this abstraction buttresses itself with the thesis that if
this particular conduct is allowed to flourish (which may or may not require
one to argue in the "logical extreme"), society as we now know it (and
presumably cherish it) will "disintegrate". 60 Said in another way: There is a
risk that this conduct may eventually break our society down, even though its
immediate harm to others is virtually non-existent. This is not paternalism
and it is readily apparent that a number of assumptions have to be made
which are not self-evident or certain. In attacking these assumptions, Devlin's
opponents, the pragmatic moral pluralist's, demand empirical evidence of
this "disintegration thesis".61 "History", is his retort, reaffirming the moralist
belief that the community is dependent on its essential moral structure.62
The issue is: when is the risk of harm to society sufficiently remote or
nebulous as not to outweigh the interest of the individual's liberty?
The level least compelling, conduct involving risk of harm to the
individual, is the contingency of the second level. The justification is the
same, however all arguments must be premised with the word "may" as we
are not dealing with actual harm. This form of paternalism is the least
legitimate and the most offensive to individual freedom. This is the level at
which the laws against use of marihuana should be discussed (with some
altering considerations like a pre-existing law) but it is continually finessed
into the other levels possessing a more compelling justification.
(b) Costs of Implementing the Criminal Law
As I stated earlier, as one moves up our suggested list of priorities the
legitimacy of state action increases. Hence less justification is required for
6 0 Lord Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1959) p. 15; See also J. F. Stephens,
Liberty, Equality and Fraternity (1873).
61Jerome H. Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue, (1968) 41 Southern Cal. L. R. 588;
Graham Hughes, Morals and the Criminal Law, (1961-62), 71 Yale L. J. 662.6? Devlin, op. cit., p. 23.
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state intervention. In relating this to our balancing process it means that
since proscription of conduct causing actual harm to others (society) is a
compelling factor, it will require more in the way of costs to deter the
implementation of the criminal sanction. Likewise proscription of conduct
involving risk of harm to the individual (which is the level we shall discuss
marihuana) will need less in the way of costs to deter the implementation of
the sanction.
Of course, the most important cost of criminally proscribing the use
of marihuana is the deprivation of the liberty of the user. In a democratic
society this is the most serious form of state intervention, so that such action
must be clearly justified. Everyone would agree that the state is justified
in removing the murderer from society. The offender has caused harm to
another person. There may be costs involved in depriving him of his liberty
but these are insufficient to prevent the implementation of the criminal
sanction. Does the same reasoning hold true for the marihuana offender?
He has participated in conduct involving a risk of harm to himself. Therefore
fewer costs of using the criminal law should deter us from using it in con-
trolling such behaviour. At this point I would like to turn away from the costs
in terms of the individual to the deleterious effects of the marihuana laws on
the criminal process.
I believe that the most important effect of the marihuana laws is that
the criminal law tends to lose its authoritative character. As we have seen,
the criminal law has not been an effective tool in deterring marihuana use.
This has been recognized by government officials. In a speech to the Canadian
Pharmaceutical Association, 3 the Minister of National Health and Welfare,
the Hon. John Munro, stated:
"the possession of marihuana being an indictable offence under the Narcotic
Control Act... does not seem to have been a very effective deterrent. Nor does
it seem to me that giving criminal records to several thousand curious kids a
year serves any worth-while social purpose."
As the criminal law loses its authoritative character, citizens also lose respect
for the law in general. Needless to say, this is a grave social problem today.
The marihuana laws only aggravate this problem. Young people have no
respect for a law which they believe to be unreasonable. As I have stressed in
this paper, a law can have little effect if it has no rational basis.
Citizens also lose respect for the law when they see it is unenforceable
as is the case of the marihuana laws. One of the reasons why these laws are
unenforceable is that we have given the criminal law a function that is
beyond its competence. Sanford Kadish has called this "The Crisis of Over-
criminalization". 4 We have too many criminal laws today because we have
lost sight of its true purpose. Of course, this leads to problems of enforce-
ment. As a spokesman for the Federal Bureau of Investigation recently stated
the issue:
"The criminal code of any jurisdiction tends to make a crime of everything that
people are against, without regard to enforceability, changing social concepts,
63 Regina, August 19, 1968.
64 The Annals of the American Academy 158.
[voL. 8, NO. 2
19701
etc. . . . The result is that the criminal code becomes society's trash bin. The
police have to rummage around in this material and are expected to prevent every-
thing that is unlawful. They cannot do so because many of the things prohibited
are simply beyond enforcement, both because of human inability to enforce the
law and because as in the case of prohibition, society acts one way and legislates
in another. If we would restrict our definition of criminal offenses in many areas,
we would get the criminal codes back to the point where they prohibit specific,
carefully defined and serious conduct, and the police could then concentrate on
enforcing the law in that context and would not waste its officers by trying to
enforce the unenforceable, as is now done."
65
This situation has led one recent empirical study to conclude that "(T)he
typical marihuana arrest occurs by chance. ' 66 With such success it is little
wonder that these laws exacerbate an already intolerable problem. Laws
like those prohibiting the use of marihuana also lead to unequal enforcement.
Of course this only increases disrespect for the law. Police enforcement tends
to concentrate where police think 'the action is'. In Toronto this means
that police efforts are concentrated in Yorkville. This increases the alienation
and fear of an already alienated and paranoid subculture. This is because
police may be over-zealous in their efforts, and because the "hippies" realize
that marihuana is extensively used in the suburbs where users go relatively
unhindered. Unfortunately this discrimination may also have been carried
to the courts. Alfred Lindesmith reports on differential enforcement of
narcotic law according to social class as follows:
"Where the addict is a well-to-do-professional man such as a physician or lawyer,
and is well-spoken and well-educated, prosecutors, policemen and judges alike are
especially strongly inclined to regard him as an 'unfortunate' or as a 'victim' of
something like a disease. The harsh penalties of the law, it is felt, were surely
not intended for a person like this, and by an unspoken agreement, arrangements
are quietly made to exempt him from such penalties." 67
Marihuana use is a 'crime without a victim'. There is therefore no
complainant. Hence police must find new ways of apprehending these
offenders since no citizen will be complaining of the proscribed conduct.
This has forced police to use such tactics as agents provocateurs, harassment,
and entrapment. Some of the uses of these techniques are contrary to our
sense of justice. To allow a policeman to entice a citizen into crime is not only
unjust but also signifies the illegitimate use of power. Unfortunately, this
situation has arisen for reasons previously discussed. These police practices
can only increase disrespect for the law while in no way effectively controlling
the use of marihuana.
The problems of enforcement do not stop here. Crimes of vice, like
marihuana use, encourage the public to make moral judgments as to
enforcement.68 This leads to great abritrariness in arrest. 69 The ramifications
of this are obvious.
The application of marihuana laws also leads to economic problems.
The costs of enforcement and adjudication are increasing in a system in
65 The U.S. Task Force on the Administration of Justice: The Courts, p. 107.
66 Marihuana Laws: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in
Los Angeles County, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1499, 1505.
67 The Addict and the Law (1965), p. 90.
68 Skolnick, op. cit., p. 632.
69 See U.C.L.A. study, supra n. 67.
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which the police and the criminal courts are already overworked. The
U.C.L.A. study described the situation as follows:
"Financially, the enforcement of the marihuana laws is very expensive. Thousands
of hours of police time are consumed in apprehending marihuana offenders; many
more hours are spent by the police in court; and our criminal courts are already
plagued by oppressive caseloads, are ill-equipped to handle the staggering increase
in marihuana trials."70
R. H. Blum, an American expert on the drug problem, also recognized this
grave situation:
" ... it is evident that if arrests increase still further both the courts and the
correctional facilities will be taxed beyond their capacities. Police narcotic squads
are already in this position although they are in a better position to control their
work loads."71
Marihuana laws also have a bad effect on the criminal process in that
the position of organized crime is enhanced. The syndicate which supplies
marihuana is selling it at an inflated price because 'pot' is illegal. Business
is good and the risk of being apprehended is slight. This thesis has not gone
unchallenged. Erich Goode has writtei that the syndicate does not deal in
marihuana "because it is so easily grown and distributed by so many diverse
sources that it would be impossible to capture and control a steady market.72
Be that as it may, some criminal traffickers are aided by the illegality of
marihuana. Furthermore, because of police methods already described, police
officers must use informers and other members of the criminal element. This
increases contact with criminals and may unfortunately lead to co-operation
with criminals for illegal purposes. 73
Finally, criminalizing marihuana use may have long term bad effects
in the criminal process. First, because it is illegal, young people must
associate with the criminal element in order to acquire marihuana. Secondiy,
if a young person is convicted and given a criminal record his economic and
social potential are seriously restricted because of this record. This may lead to
more criminal activity. Thirdly, if he is sent to jail, the contacts and
associations that he will meet there may unfortunately affect his life.
Fourthly, the fact that marihuana is illegal may entice many young people to
use it and therefore aggravate the problems for the police. This is not
a frivolous relationship as was indicated by the recent eradication of obscenity
laws in Denmark. Finally, in giving a young marihuana user a criminal
record, we may be causing effects that are not readily foreseeable. E. M.
Schur in his book, Crimes Without Victims, described these effects as follows:
"Just as the mere knowledge that he has become a 'criminal' may alter the
individual's self-image, so too may legal proscription drive him into various be-
havior patterns that reinforce this image and that create new problems for himself
and for society at large." 74
The deleterious effects on the criminal process of proscribing marihuana
use are grave. These must be considered in light of the fact that police
70 Ibid., 1513.
71 Students and Drugs (1969) p. 364.
72 Marihuana, (1969) p. 4.
73 See Skolnick, op. cit. pp. 630-34.
74 E. M. Schur, Crimes Without Victims (1965) p. 6.
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enforcement of these laws has been very unsuccessful in controlling its use.
Now we should consider costs to the individual and society after the offender
is apprehended and placed within the judicial process. In effect we shall
discuss whether the judicial application of marihuana laws will be effective
in controlling its use.
C. Principles of Sentencing
Because I have adopted a purposive approach, I have assumed that the
criminal law will only be used when its use is consistent with the purposes of
criminal punishment. In this section I shall apply this general theory to a
practical problem. Hopefully this will answer whether legislation proscribing
the use of marihuana is consistent with sentencing principles.
(a) Retribution
The first theory of punishment which I will discuss is the retribution or
the expiation theory. This is the revenge theory of an "eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth". Today it does not hold many adherents. For instance,
the Ouimet Report rejected it. "The cost to the community of incarceration
and the damage to and the subsequent danger from an individual punished for
vengeance make the execution of vengeance totally unacceptable to any
rationally motivated community." 75 These are strong and sensible words but
this theory should not be quickly dismissed. Such formidable legal philoso-
phers as Professor Fuller have defended this theory.76 His three reasons for
its legitimacy are: First, if criminal acts are not punished, then they may
become the object of private revenge. If you kill my brother, then, as my
brother's keeper, I may come and kill you if you go unpunished. I hope that
this reason is untrue today; however, even if it does have validity, it has no
application to marihuana smoking. This is a victimless crime so that there
is no victim to take revenge. Secondly, the criminal trial provides a
"symbolic function of reinforcing the public sense that there are certain
acts that are fundamentally wrong, that must not be done." 77 Furthermore,
only through suffering punishment can the criminal expiate his sin. I
reject this justification because I believe that such symbolic functions are
the province of the moral law and not the criminal law. However, even if my
thesis is rejected, this symbolic function that Fuller suggests has no relevance
to the use of marihuana. Before this purpose is served, the conduct must
be accepted as fundamentally wrong. If there is a substantial segment of the
population which does not accept this, then no amount of criminal prosecu-
tions will convince them of the wrongfulness of the conduct. This is the
situation with marihuana. The criminal sanction here rather than providing
respect for the law, only increases disrespect for the law in a society which no
longer can afford such disrespect. Finally, Professor Fuller suggests that
punishment also exists for the benefit of the law abiding citizen. If a person
75 See at p. 188.
76 See L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law, pp. 27-30.
77 Ibid., 28.
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disobeys the law then he should be penalized and if he observes the law
then he should be rewarded (i.e., by going unpunished). This may be true
but again I suggest that it has no relevance to the use of marihuana. This
justification is valid only as long as there is effective enforcement of the law.
The honest man is induced to remain honest because he sees the dishonest
man being penalized for his actions. However, as we have seen, only a
minimal number of marihuana users are ever penalized by the law. The
honest man realizes this and hence his "reward" becomes illusory.
(b) Rehabilitation
This of course is the most humane theory of punishment. As we saw
earlier in the section on legislative history, Parliament supposedly made this
purpose paramount in offences under The Narcotic Control Act. But how
reasonable is this approach? I would suggest that this approach is not
viable today. Herbert Packer, in his already classical study, The Limits of the
Criminal Sanction, has written that rehabilitation should not be taken as the
primary goal of punishment because it does not work. We can send men to
the moon but we cannot cure them of criminal tendencies. Because of this
we are only kidding ourselves if we accept the rehabilitative ideal as our
primary concern in criminal punishment. Unfortunately the Ouimet Committee
fell into this trap.73
Furthermore, rehabilitation is only successful when the offender wants to
be rehabilitated. He first has to become convinced that his conduct is wrong.
I suggest that this is an impossible task in the case of marihuana users.
A substantial segment of society, as well as the users, are convinced that such
conduct is not wrong. It is the law that should be reformed, not the offenders.
Finally, we must not forget that in attempting to reform a person we are
depriving him of his liberty. Before we do this, we must be pretty sure about
our purposes. Even if we had a 'cure', the efficacy of rehabilitation is still
doubtful because "it is more of an affront to human dignity to subject a man
to compulsory improvement than it is to punish him."79 This is especially true
in the case of a marihuana offender who very likely needs no rehabilitation.
(c) Incapacitation
Of course, the purpose of this is to deprive the offender of the
capacity to commit further crimes. As was mentioned before, this deprivation
of liberty should be done only after serious consideration. The Ouimet Com-
mittee accepted this by recommending that sentences of imprisonment should
only be imposed where the protection of society clearly requires such
penalty.80 The question now becomes whether this purpose is consistent with
punishing marihuana offenders.
We first must ask ourselves whether the marihuana offender will repeat
his crime. We must answer yes. [As long as a person feels that a law has no
78 See at p. 189.
70 Fuller, op. cit.,
80 See Report at p. 190.
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rational basis, then no amount of punishment will induce him to stop
offending.] Does this mean that because of this recidivism we must 'lock-up'
the marihuana offender for substantial periods of time knowing that his
acquaintances in prison will have a debilitating effect upon him? The only
way to answer this is to ask whether society needs to be protected from his
conduct. As I have tried to show earlier, the harm caused to society by the
use of marihuana is minimal. If there is any harm at all, it is to the
individual user. And as we have already seen this individual harm is also
doubtful. With such evidence we may conclude that the incarceration of
marihuana offenders is of nebulous value for three reasons. First, we are
depriving a man of his liberty when his conduct is not injurious to society.
Secondly, the long term effect of imprisonment on the offender is much more
harmful than if he went unpunished. Finally, incarceration increases the cost
of an already over-used prison system while at the same time it deprives society
of many useful participants.
(d) Deterrence
If any theory is to justify the punishment of marihuana offenders, it
must be this one. This theory may be further broken down into particular
deterrence (of the sentenced party himself) or general deterrence (other
potential offenders). As you will see in the section on the jurisprudence
in this area, deterrence is the prime consideration of our courts in sentencing
marihuana users. We have already disposed of the value of particular deter-
rence in this area when it was suggested that the marihuana offender
will likely repeat his conduct because he cannot be convinced that his
behaviour is wrong or harmful. Is the same true of general deterrence?
The answer must be yes. It is evident that the use of marihuana today,
is increasing at high rates. Therefore the criminal law has not been an
effective deterrent. The question now becomes why? The most important
reason is that we have assigned the criminal law a function that is beyond
its competence. We have decided that marihuana use is immoral and have
attached criminal sanctions to such conduct. We disregarded the practical
considerations which we discussed previously. We have called conduct
criminal which does no significant harm. Sentencing of such conduct will
not be an effective deterrent because "for sanctions to be meaningful they
must be considered by potential violators as having a rational basis." 8'
Furthermore, because of enforcement problems which we have discussed,
there is little likelihood that a user of marihuana will be caught. Because of
these two factors, the criminal law tends to lose its authoritative character.
Its general deterrent effect is minimal.
In applying the principles of criminal punishment to the problem of
marihuana, one can see that the criminal law is an ineffective tool for
regulating such conduct. If we had kept the purposes of the criminal law
sentencing in mind when we recognized the "problem", we should have
realized that it would be incompetent for the task of controlling the problem.
8l Skolnick, op cit., p. 623.
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D. Other Considerations
Before I conclude this section I would like to discuss two other factors
which should be considered before the criminal law is used to control
immoral behaviour. These factors are implicit in the other sections of this
paper. However, they are of sufficient importance to be explicitly described.
The first consideration is that the criminal law will not be implemented unless
there is social consensus that the conduct in question should be prohibited.
This is because a law will have little effect unless the majority of the
population accepts it. In the case of the criminal law the conduct prohibited is
not inherently bad. Its quality is defined as such by society. This has been
aptly described by the sociologist, Howard S. Becker, in describing deviant
behaviour:
"Deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence
of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an 'offender'. The deviant
is one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant behaviour is
behaviour that people so label."8 2
Therefore, in order that the stigma of being called criminal has any effect,
there must be a social consensus that the conduct in question is truly criminal.
This relationship between the public and the law leads us into questions of
political philosophy. We must decide the scope of the law making power of the
state. This problem has been described in the Wolfendon Report as follows:83
"We have had to consider the relationships between law and public opinion. It
seems to us that there are two over-definite views about this. On the one hand it is
held that the law ought to follow behind public opinion, so that the law can count
on the support of the community as a whole. On the other hand, it is held that
a necessary purpose of the law is to lead or fortify public opinion. Certainly it is
clear that if any legal enactment is markedly out of tune with public opinion it
will quickly fall into disrepute. Beyond this we should not wish to dogmatize, for
on the matters which we are called upon to deal with we have not succeeded in
discovering an unequivocal public opinion, and we have felt bound to try to reach
conclusions for ourselves rather than to base them on what is often transient and
seldom precisely ascertainable."
What role should public opinion play in the case of marihuana? Can
we find an unequivocal public opinion on the issue of marihuana? The
Canadian Institute of Public Opinion informed me that no opinion polls
have been taken in Canada about marihuana.8 4 However, it seems that a
significant number of young people in our society believe that the use of mari-
huana is neither criminal nor immoral. Whether this segment is large enough to
deny the criminal sanction is for the legislator to decide. But perhaps the
legislator should be leading public opinion in this area. He has the evidence
before him describing the effects of such behaviour of which the majority
of the public is unaware. He is the one who should be directing the use of the
criminal law. Public opinion does not realize the limits of the criminal law.
The legislator should. Therefore it is he who should make the decision and
not the 'silent majority'.
8 2 Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (1963), p. 9.
88 See Report at p. 10.
84 A Gallup Poll in the U.S. (Oct. 1969) showed 84% against the liberalization of
the laws, 12% in favour and 4% undecided.
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This leads us to our next consideration. That is whether there are
reasonable alternatives to the criminal law in regulating such behaviour. I
would suggest that there are. However, this is not the place to describe them.
For our purposes it may be sufficient to say that it has been proposed that
marihuana be regulated like alcohol. For instance, the government would set
quality standards, would prohibit its sale to the young and would prohibit
driving under its influence.
In conclusion I would like to briefly summarize the effects of the
preceding discussion. The only justification for criminally proscribing the
use of marihuana is that it involves conduct which may result in harm to the
individual user. The costs of using the criminal law on the individual,
society and the criminal process are grave. I would suggest that the costs are
sufficient to preclude the use of the criminal law in this area. Finally
even if the costs were insufficient to deter its use, I would argue that the
criminal law should not be used because it is an ineffective tool in controlling
the use of marihuana. Enforcement problems make apprehension unlikely.
Judicial application of the laws will have little effect on potential users of
marihuana. Correctional facilities are unlikely to convince the user of the
"wrongness" of his conduct. In other words the criminal law is incompetent
to deal with the problem of marihuana.
V. MARIHUANA AND THE COURTS
(a) The Canadian Case Law
Within the last few years the Courts have been attempting to expound
certain principles in sentencing offenders of the Narcotic Control Act. This
was really a necessity as the volume of such cases before the Courts required
some uniformity in judicial action. Before this time, however, the Courts
in such cases relied on the accepted general principles of punishment. In
other words, the narcotic offender was treated like the common criminal. For
instance, in R. v. Zimmer,8 5 a case of trafficking, the Court accepted the
principles laid down in R. v. Calder,s6 an attempted robbery case. These
principles are shown below:
"It should be said at once that the purpose of punishment for crime is not that,
through the medium of a judge who is authorized by law to impose it, vengeance
may be wreaked upon the guilty for their crime, as though crime was private in
charactdr. In the narrow sense a crime is usually an offence against an individual,
involving his person or his property .... In the broader sense, in which the courts
must regard it, crime is an offence against the State and is punished by the State
on much different principles.
The main purpose of the imposition of punishment is the good of the State,
that is, society generally. If the culprit by his conduct has demonstrated that he
is anti-social, then society excludes him from its membership temporarily or per-
manently. Punishment is also imposed as a deterrent to others from committing
similar crimes. It is the expression of the condemnation by the State of the
wrong done to society. There must, therefore always be a right proportion
85 (1956) 19 W.W.R. 138.
86 (1956) 17 W.W.R. 528.
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between the punishment imposed and the gravity of the offence. It is in that
sense that it is said that certain crimes 'deserve' certain punishments and not on
any theory of retribution. Added to the foregoing, of course, there is the desir-
ability of reforming the criminal wherever that is possible, and restoring him
to society."
There are two prominent types of cases which have consistently come
before the Court. These are possession and trafficking, or possession for the
purpose of trafficking.
The first series of cases with which we will deal are those of possession.
The first case is R. v. Ross, 87 in which the defendant was convicted of posses-
sion and given 18 months. The evidence was that it was only constructive
possession. This excessive sentence was appealed (even the Crown joined in
the appeal). The B.C. Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to one year, and
stated:
"On appeals from sentences the Court of Appeal should see to it that sentences
are commensurate with the gravity of the offences". 88
Two things here should be noted. First, the Court is still treating the narcotic
offender as a common criminal. Secondly, this is the Court which has been
most active in developing the jurisprudence in this area.
The next case is R. v. Budd, a 1965 unreported B.C. Court of Appeal
case. Here the 21 year old female student was convicted of possession of
marihuana. She appealed a six months sentence. The Court, in dismissing
the appeal said:
" ...this Court will support his (i.e., trial judge) imposition of even greater
penalties in the future in an attempt to stamp out the incipient social evil
in our community".
Notice how the public interest here is protected at the expense of completely
disregarding the interest of the individual.
This case was discussed in R. v. Hartley and McCallurm (No. 2).89 The
defendants here were 18 and 21 years of age with neither having a previous
criminal record. Each was given six months. In the course of the judgment
the Court clearly shows the priorities which it has chosen. This case shows
the Court evolving specific principles for a special problem. The Court has
recognized the problem. It has developed an approach albeit a very
conservative one. Deterrence is still to override rehabilitation. It is sub-
mitted that this is only one of the many cases where the Court has
diminished the importance of the latter purpose at the expense of not fully
effecting the legislative purpose. As we saw in a previous section, Mr. Fulton
clearly intended that rehabilitation was primary in the new legislative
approach. He admitted that the old approach (i.e., deterrence) was a failure.
However, the important thing is that the Court is consciously attacking a
contemporary problem. Unfortunately their decisions are marred by the
unconscious effect of their own prejudices and values. Below are the key
statements from the case:
87 (1955) (B.C.C.A.) 15 W.W.R. 134.
88 Ibid., p. 134.
80 (1968) 2 C.C.C. 187.
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"The predominant factor in this case is the deterrent effect upon others. This
Court two years ago in the Budd case (R. v. Budd decided January 15, 1965
unreported), said that the possession of marijuana is a serious offence and it
must be punished severely. The purpose of course was to deter the use of mari-
juana, among other reasons, because users must obtain supplies, and the supply
of the drug involves trafficking, and that, as the market increases, that traffic
becomes organized, and the organized traffic tends to increase the use of the drug.
It was our hope then, although I was not party to that decision, that substantial
gaol sentences imposed upon people convicted of having possession of marijuana
for their own use would reduce the number of users, and consequently the
trafficking necessary to supply the market. We also feared that if we did not treat
this offence seriously that the traffic would continue to develop and users would
increase. Our fears have been borne out by the experience over the past few years.
Our hopes have been disappointed because with deference some of the members
of the magisterial bench have failed to fully appreciate our purpose in the Budd
case. Too many of these convictions for possession of marijuana have been treated
too leniently... 90
"In this case the deterrent aspect, as I said, is the important one. The rehabilitation
of offenders is secondary. If .the use of this drug is not stopped, it is going to
be followed by an organized marketing system. That must be prevented if possible.
We think that is the principal consideration which should move us."91
The next case is R. v. Adelman.92 The defendant was convicted of
possession of marihuana. He was a 25 year old brilliant student who had no
previous record. The trial judge gave him a suspended sentence. On appeal,
the Court of Appeal imposed a six months sentence. It laid down sentencing
guidelines for magistrates:
"The sole concern of judges and magistrates in imposing sentences is to act in
the public interest. That public interest may be advanced in two ways:
(1) By the imposition of a sentence which will deter others from the commission
of the same offence, or
(2) By the imposition of a sentence that will promote the rehabilitation of the
prisoner so that he will not offend again and will become a useful member
of society."93
However, in applying this to its particular facts, the Court said that
"There is no question of xehabilitation here. This respondent does not require to
be rehabilitated. His need is a change of attitude and that rests with himself." 94
In effect, the defendant was severely penalized because of his intelligence.
The Court felt that he was more blameworthy than the average person
because of his aptitude.
The next case is R. v. Reynolds.95 The defendant was convicted of
possession of marihuana and was given one day and a $500 fine. He had no
previous record. Here the Court applied general principles to an offence
under a statute which had a policy that required a more particular approach:
"Under the present state of the law the primary element in determining the
sentence is that of deterrence." 96
However, the Court proceeds and expounds a theory which gives more
discretion to the trial judge:
9 Ibid., p. 188.
91 Ibid., p. 189.
92 (1968) (B.C.C.A.) 63 W.W.R. 294.
93 Ibid., p. 296.
94 Ibid., p. 304.
95 (1968) (B.C.C.A.) 66 W.W.R. 767.
96 Ibid., p. 767.
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"Imprisonment is not mandatory although the element of deterrence remains
primary. It is the function of the judge or magistrate imposing sentence in the
first instance, to apply his mind judicially to the question, whether in the particular
case before him special circumstances exist which justify a sentence that is not
primarily deterrent in its effect." 97
In R. v. Falk9s the Manitoba Court of Appeal, in laying down a very
particular approach for cases of possession of marihuana, gave the trial
judge a great deal of discretion in disposing of such cases. It stated:
"Under this circumstance the protection of the public becomes a matter of more
than usual significance. It becomes a particularly important objective to which
magistrates and judges should give careful attention when considering the question
of sentencing. Each case must be dealt with on its own merits, but it is my view
that in the present situation it will often be appropriate to impose a term of
imprisonment even on first offenders, where in other circumstances suspended
sentence might be deemed an adequate disposition." 99
The final case in this area is R. v. Lehrmann.100 It reviews most of the
recent jurisprudence in this area. The defendant, a young University student
and teaching assistant, was convicted of unlawful possession of marihuana.
He had no previous criminal record and the offence involved a relatively
small amount of the drug for personal use. At trial he was given one day in
jail. However, the Alberta Court of Appeal increased this term to three
months. It decided that a sentence of one day was inadequate because the
use of marihuana has become all too prevalent. Deterrence is primary and not
enough magistrates consider this when imposing sentences:
. . . the sentence imposed in the case we now have under consideration can
have little or no deterrent effect on other persons who may wish to engage in or
experiment with the use of the narcotic in question, and it seems to me that the
deterrent effect of sentences meted out in such cases is a matter of paramount
importance."1 01
The Court then went on to say that the defendant should, above all, have
appreciated the necessity of maintaining a high standard of personal conduct
and setting a good example to the young people with whom he was in
contact.10
2
Our next area of concern is section 4 of the Act which prohibits
trafficking or possession for the purposes of trafficking any narcotic drug.
We should remember the Debates to see the legislative intention for this
offence. It appeared to be agreed that this is a very despicable offence and
this is shown in the life imprisonment for which the offender is liable.
Like the previously discussed offence, the courts did not develop a
rationale for sentencing traffickers until quite recently. The older cases
did not discuss the purposes of sentencing in this area. A typical case is
R. v. Wilson,103 where the magistrate gave the convicted trafficker 6 months
and $200. The Court of Appeal increased this sentence to 4 years and $200
because it felt that the magistrate was too lenient.
97 Ibid., p. 767.
98 (1968), 67 W.W.R. 215.
9 Ibid., p. 216.
100 (1969) 2 C.C.C. 198. (Alta. C.A.).
101 Ibid., p. 204.
102 Ibid., p. 204.
103 (1954) 11 W.W.R. 282.
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Before we discuss any rationale which has developed we should look at
distinctions which have been introduced into this offence. The first is found
in R. v. Kazmer et al.10 4 The Court here distinguished between those
traffickers in the business and those not. At p. 154 the Court said:
"We think this class of offence (i.e., not in the business) is not as serious as that
of selling drugs in a business and in consequence some distinction in the degree
of punishment imposed should be recognized by the imposition of sentences of
imprisonment less than the maximum permitted by the Opium and Narcotic Drug
Act"
In this case the Court reduced the sentence from 7 years and $1000 plus
whipping to 5 years and $500 plus whipping. This distinction has been
accepted in R. v. Stephenson'o5 and R. v. Seibel.0 6
In R. v. Campbell,0 7 there are two further distinctions introduced. One
is explicit and the other is implicit in the decision. The first distinction is the
one between a trafficker who is a drug addict and one who is not. In the case
of the latter, the Court is likely to be more severe.
'"The fact (i.e., that he was a non-addict) ... was a circumstance proper to beconsidered by the learned county court judge. It shows that this operation was a
full scale capping operation, indicating that the trafficking was a cold blooded
mercenary business."108
A second possible distinction is one between a trafficker of heroin and
one of marihuana. In this case, Campbell was trafficking heroin. He
received 10 years for the offence. Even though large amounts were found,
this sentence appears to be quite severe since it was his first offence. It is
much higher than the cases of trafficking in marihuana which we will discuss
later. The Court here does not refer to any such distinction.
In recent years courts have been recognizing the drug problem and have
attempted to develop a rational approach to sentencing. A good case
exemplifying this is R. v. Hudson,10 9 in which Kelly, 3. A. wrote a well thought
out opinion. Hudson was an 18 year old Yorkviller who was convicted of
trafficking. The magistrate suspended the passing of sentence upon the
defendant entering a recognizance to observe for two years certain conditions
(e.g., reside with parents, 10 p.m. curfew, return to school). The Ontario
Court of Appeal accepted Kazmer's distinction but it decided that Hudson
fell in neither class. He was part of a sub-culture of young persons character-
ized by a retreat from the world of reality through the use of drugs. Kelly, 1.
A. then gave a description of life, conditions and philosophy in Yorkville. He
recognized that the ordinary purposes of sentencing should not apply in this
case.
"Those of whom the accused is one, who have accepted the use of psychedelic
drugs as a socially desirable as well as a personally desirable course of conduct,
are not as likely to be discouraged by the type of punishment ordinarily meted
out to other traffickers; such treatment will likely serve to confirm them in their
belief in the drug cult.""10
104 (1953) (B.C.C.A.) 105 C.C.C. 153.
105 21 W.W.R. 256; 117 C.C.C. 292.
106 2 S.C.R. 214; 20 W.W.R. 400.
107 (1969) (B.C.C.A.) 67 W.W.R. 678.
108 Ibid., p. 679.
109 (1967) 2 O.R. 501. (Ont. C.A.).
110 Ibid., p. 506.
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Rehabilitation was Kelly's prime concern. He was convinced that
"it is apparent that a solution, if one exists, must be found in the voluntary
rejection of that way of life (Yorkville) and a return to conformity to the
standards not unacceptable to the majority of society.""'
Hence he accepted the magistrate's decision although recognizing its
possible weaknesses.
"When there have been more occasions from which it is possible to appraise the
effect of such a disposition, and if it should be proven by such experience that a
Magistrate could not consider that his disposition gave adequate recognition to all
of the principles proper to sentencing, it may well be that this Court may feel that
there was an error in principle in a sentence similar to that imposed on the
accused. Until such experience has been accumulated, even realizing that the
Magistrate is venturing into an area where there is little to guide him, I do not
find him in error when he decided it was expedient that the accused be released
on probation upon entering into a recognizance which contained the terms which
the Magistrate imposed."" 2
The reasoned approach of Kelly, J. A. was effectively diluted in R. v.
Simpson.'l This 19 year old Yorkviller was convicted on 4 counts of
trafficking marihuana. The magistrate gave the defendant 4 months definite
and 6 months indefinite on each of the 4 charges, to be served concurrently.
The accused appealed the sentence emphasizing the principles laid down in
Hudson. The Court (Aylesworth, Mackay, Kelly, Evans, Laskin) however,
said that Hudson must be confined to its particular facts. It did not stand
for the proposition that "those who traffic in marihuana are to receive lenient
treatment in some special cases if it appears that the convicted persons are
members of a particular cult...
The Court also pointed out the importance of deterrence in relation to
rehabilitation:
"The Magistrate in imposing sentence properly charged himself as to the elements
to be considered, namely, reformation, deterrence and prevention, but in our view,
upon the facts before him, failed to attribute sufficient importance to the element
of deterrence to others so that the evils inherent in trafficking in drugs may be
checked if not eliminated. The sentences imposed, however, were proper even
although the Magistrate over-emphasized the importance of the element of refor-
mation as contrasted with deterrence. 'Accordingly, we do not propose to interfere.
Nevertheless, it is important that we give our reasons for not doing so. At the
conclusion of the argument of the appeal, we indicated our disposition of it and
that we would deliver our reasons for dismissal at a later date."
Finally the Court emphasized the public interest in the form of general
deterrence:
"Some six months or more have elapsed since the decision in R v. Hudson and
in the case at bar statistical information was introduced demonstrating that the
evil of trafficking in marijuana in the City of Toronto is markedly on the increase,
that such trafficking among juveniles now are a matter of frequent occurrence in
the Juvenile Courts of the city.
The appellant was a frequenter of 'Yorkville' and belonged to the proselytizing
cult so aptly described in the Hudson case. Undoubtedly, many members of that
cult are intelligent enough to know better than to expect that they may run
counter to the criminal law of this country without risking imprisonment; those of
them who lack such an intelligence must learn what to expect from such conduct.
III Ibid., p. 505.
112 Ibid., p. 508.
13 (1968) 2 O.R. 270. (Ont. C.A.).
114 Ibid., p. 271.
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Finally and importantly, the protection of the public must include consideration of
the interests, health and well-being of the vast majority of young people comprising
individuals presently uncommitted to the use of this drug. As I have said, the
sentence was appropriate; it is by no means a severe one, bearing in mind the
gravity with which the offence must be regarded by reason of the maximum penalty
of life imprisonment provided by the statute."1' 5
This view was also accepted by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in R. v.
McNicol.n 6 The defendant was convicted of possessing marihuana for the
purpose of trafficking. The magistrate gave him one month and $400 so
that his imprisonment would not interfere with his entrance into university.
The Court of Appeal increased this sentence to one year. The public interest,
in the form of general deterrence, clearly overrode the interest of the
individual, in the form of rehabilitation.
"In the instant case, a sentence of one.month in jail, to which was added a fine of
$400, was totally inadequate for the nature, the gravity and the increased prevalence
of the offence. Furthermore, the learned magistrate seemed much too concerned
with the possible rehabilitation of this young offender. In doing so, he com-
pletely disregarded the interests of the community and put those of the individual
ahead of those of the community."" 7
Interestingly, the Court quoted extensively from Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts v. Leis and Weiss to show marihuana is a harmful and dangerous
drug. Unfortunately, it appears that Canadian courts only quote American
cases when they substantiate the Court's decision.
In R. v. Martin (unreported)"s the defendant was a 22 year old house-
wife. She was convicted of trafficking in marihuana and given 4 years. The
Court justified this severe penalty by pointing out that life was the maximum
penalty for this offence. "This maximum penalty reflects the gravity of the
crime."
In R. v. Racine,"9 the 21 year old defendant had no previous record.
He was convicted of trafficking 11/2 lbs. of marihuana. At trial he was given
two months. The Court of Appeal increased this to 9 months because the
trial sentence may have been an effective special deterrent but it was an
inadequate general deterrent.
The sentence imposed might deter the accused but it was sadly deficient in deterr-
ing others from engaging in the most repulsive of trades."
In R. v. Tremayne,120 the Court tries to balance the general deterrent
purpose of sentencing and the reformative purpose:
You are all young and this is your first conviction. However, I must impose a
substantial term of imprisonment, both for the protection of the public and as a
deterrent to others. I am, however, not going to make it so long that you will not
have any hope of reform."
A recent case which emphasized rehabilitation is R. v. Nolet.121 The
defendant's sentence was reduced to 2 years less a day because, having regard
115 Ibid., p. 272.
116 (1968) 5 C.R.N.S. 242.
17 Ibid., p. 250.
118 (B.C. Cty. Ct.) April 23, 1969 (unreported).
119 (B.C.C.A.) April 2, 1969 (unreported).
120 (Ont. Cty. Judge Weaver), April 28, 1969, (unreported).
121 (Alta. CA.) May 6, 1969 (unreported).
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to the offender's youth, there was a better prospect of rehabilitation if sentence
was served in a provincial jail. However, the description of this case is
sketchy so that it would be premature to draw any conclusions about a
change in judicial approach.
Another recent case which tended to diminish the role of deterrence in
this area is R. v. Lurre.122 The 21 year old defendant brought marihuana
back from Mexico and gave some to each of his roommates. The trial judge
said that it was not in the public interest to impose a long sentence here. The
Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the Crown's appeal:
"Although deterrence, an important factor in the sentencing of marihuana offend-
ers, was usually to be best achieved by a meaningful term of imprisonment, there
were cases where the imposition of a lenient or even suspended sentence could be
in the public interest."
An interesting refinement was introduced by R. v. Mills.2-3 In that case,
the 19 year old offender, with no previous record, was convicted of selling one
1 gram of marihuana to the R.C.M.P. In approving a sentence of only one
month and $500, McFarlane, J. stated:
While this sale must be regarded as falling within the definition of 'traffic' in
see. 2(1) of the... Act, I think the respondent's conduct would not be described
as trafficking in the commonly accepted sense of the word."
The next case is Proc. Gen. Du Canada v. Lebrun.124 This case was
decided in Quebec where the problem is not as acute as in British Columbia
or in Toronto. A typical Quebec approach is taken in which the public
interest is paramount. At trial the accused was given 12 months but the
Court of Appeal increased this trafficking conviction to 7 years. The Court of
Appeal said:
" .. . at a time when the incidence of certain crimes was constantly increasing
and on the other hand when systems for rehabilitation were in operation, it had
become not only permissible but necessary in the interests of society that courts
should accentuate exemplariness in sentencing."
The last case which I could find in this area is also a Quebec case, R. v.
Grandbois.125 The 24 year old defendant was charged with trafficking in $7.00
worth of hashish. I would like to comprehensively discuss this case because
it does such a thorough, albeit onesided job. The Court first proceeds in
defining and distinguishing marihuana and, hashish. Then it goes on to
describe the effects of these drugs. It refers to a brochure published by rOpta
to quote Dr. Andre Boudreau who describe., the deleterious effects of these
drugs. Then it quotes the poet Baudelaire who also describes these harmful
effects (this must be a first!). It then quotes the "Memorandum to Con-
sumers" in which the Minister of National Health and Welfare substantiates
these descriptions. Finally it refers to Judge Tauro, C.J.C., of Massa-
chusetts, who in a case thoroughly reviewed the American jurisprudence and
had before him such experts as Dr. D. B. Louria of New York who testified
that marihuana was harmful. The Quebec court then reaches some
conclusions:
122 (Sask. C.A.) June 26, 1969 (unreported).
123 (B.C.C.A.) May 28th, 1969 (unreported).
124 (Quebec C.A.) March 19, 1969 (unreported).
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"(a) That the use of marihuana and hashish involves serious dangers;
(b) That there is a direct relationship between the use of these drugs and the
use of heroin;
(c) That in order to procure these drugs, one must necessarily associate with
those who traffic in them, or with 'pushers' who live off crime.
' 126
The Court then quotes Alvin Moscow's book "Merchants of Heroin"
(1968). The author had access to the services and records of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics. He reproduces passages from this book. Unfortunately
the court was unaware of Skolnil's criticisms on the bias of this Bureau.
127
Finally, the Court quotes from a brief from counsel for the Attorney-
General of Canada. It described the conditions of the drug problem in
Montreal in 1965. This is the first Brandeis-type brief accepted in a Canadian
court of which I am aware since its notorious treatment in the Saumur case.as
Then the Court discusses the jurisprudence which we have already
reviewed. In conclusion the Court held:
"I have not taken into consideration the fact that you have no previous criminal
record, and that you have been in prison since October, 1968. I am therefore
sentencing you to two years in the penitentiary, and I hope that the authorities
in the St. Vincent de Paul Penitentiary will, after assessing your capabilities, place
you in the federal rehabilitation center where you will have the opportunity to
learn a trade and to return to society, better prepared to face the difficulties of
life."
1 29
Some Tentative Conclusions on the Sentencing of Narcotic Offenders
1. Judicial Action
(1) The Courts have not developed uniformity of action in the area of
sentencing. But there is some consistency in that the public interest usually
overrides the interest of the individual. However, there are a few sporadic
cases where the individual interest does supersede.
(2) Of all the principles of sentencing, deterrence is clearly primary in
Canadian cases of narcotic offences. This is so even after Mr. Fulton admitted
in the 1960 Debates that this approach had failed in the past.
(3) The Courts have not questioned the Legislature's use of the
criminal law power to regulate and restrict the use and traffic of narcotic drugs
in Canada.
(4) The Courts are not offering the Legislature any suggestions on how
oT why these laws should be changed. This may be a product of a lack of
expertise or of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty.
126 Ibid., p. 332.
127 J. H. Skolnik, Supra n. 22 at pp. 597-601.
128 [19531 SCR 299.
129 Lebrun, p. 336.
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2. The Problem
(1) The Courts have recognized that this is a significant social problem.
They have generally taken a conservative approach and assumed that mari-
huana is harmful.
(2) The Courts hardly ever refer to scientific and social evidence on
narcotic drugs. When they do, they only refer to the evidence which tends
to show that marihuana is harmful. I saw no evidence to the contrary being
referred to.
(3) The Courts recognize that the problem is increasing. However,
they tend to attribute this to inadequate sentencing. They do not ever
question the effectiveness of the present policies of the legislature.
3. Characteristics of Cases
(1) The problem is definitely localized. The majority of cases have
been decided by the B.C.C.A. and the O.C.A. to a lesser extent.
(2) There were no cases decided by a Maritime court.
(3) Most cases concern marihuana.
(4) Most cases, in both possession and trafficking, deal with first
offenders.
4. Characteristics of Offenders
(1) They are usually intelligent young people (in both offences) so that
the rehabilitative purpose of the criminal law is not that important.
(2) These young people are usually hippies and students rather than
other types. This might suggest something about the incidence of the
problem or the enforcement by police.
(3) The Ontario Court of Appeal in Simpson stated that these "hippies"
will not be given special treatment by the law even though in Hudson it
recognized that the purposes of sentencing would be defeated in such cases.
(4) There were no recent cases of middle-aged or older people. This
might also suggest something about incidence or enforcement.
(5) There was only one case of a narcotic addict.
5. Possession
(1) In possession of marihuana cases of first offenders (the majority of
these cases), the sentences usually range from a suspended sentence to a
year. The maximum is 7 years with no minimum.
(2) Possession of harder drugs and second offenders are treated more
severely.
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(3) From the Debates it appeared that in the past the Courts were
lenient for such offenders. That is why no minimum was set for this offence
in the 1954 legislation.
(4) The Courts definitely distinguish between marihuana and other
drugs although they may deny this. They have been given a great deal of
discretion in these cases as the Legislature intended.
6. Trafficking
(1) The trafficker of marihuana is likely to get from a suspended sentence
to 2 years (Lebrun is an exception) if he is a young first offender and not in
the business (as is usually the case). This is really quite lenient when you
consider that life is the maximum and when you remember that many
parliamentarians did not think this was severe enough.
(2) The Courts will be harsher when it is not a first offence and when
the drug is not marihuana.
(3) There are some discernible distinctions in cases of this type:
(a) whether the offender is in the business of drug trafficking or
not;
(b) the type of drug being trafficked;
(c) the amount of drug that the offender is caught with;
(d) whether the offender is a member of the subculture (this was
rejected by Simpson).
(4) The law is not reaching the 'big-time' trafficker.
7. Specific Problems
The Courts are in a precarious position because:
(1) The laws (especially relating to marihuana) are not acceptable to
many people. They feel that such offences are not criminal or immoral.
(2) The Courts are usually dealing with first offenders so that their
discretion is great but their guidelines are few.
(3) The Courts are dealing with intelligent young people who do not
need rehabilitation and are not deterred because of their feelings of the law.
Incapacitation would likely cause more harm than it would cure. The only
principle that the Courts still have is in general deterrence, even though the
evidence is that the problem is ever increasing.
(4) The Courts are applying general principles to a very unique
problem.
(5) The Courts have found themselves in the transitory period when
the Legislature is likely to change the law very soon.
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(6) The Court has the power, and perhaps the responsibility, to
impose a criminal record on a young intelligent person for the rest of his life.
Balanced against this is its own conception of a grave social evil that should
be eradicated.
8. Legislative Policy
(1) Although not supposedly intended under the Act, deterrence still
plays the primary role in the Courts.
(2) The deterrent effect of the Act is not as great as Parliament hoped:
(a) It has not restricted the traffic of drugs in Canada;
(b) It has not reduced the number of users of drugs in Canada.
